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THE TERMINATION OF WAR.

HE termination of war must, at the outset, be distinguished
T
from the termination of hostilities or actual warfare. As has
been said, wax: is "not the mere employment of force, but the existence of the legal condition of things in which rights are or may be
prosecuted by force. Thus, if two nations declare war one against
the other, war exists, though no force whatever may as yet have
been employed." 1 Similarly, it follows that, although actual hostilities have ceased, the status of war may continue until terminated in
some regular way recognized by international law as sufficient for
that purpose. Actual hostilities are frequently terminated as the
result of the signing of an armistice or a capitulation which may
take the form of a protocol or preliminary agreement which regulates the relations between the belligerents until the definitive treaty
of peace is signed and ratified.
There is no question that the President has full power to bring
about the suspension of hostilities on his sole authority. Thus, during the Spanish-American War, actual hostilities were suspended
by the protocol of August 12, 1898, (which was not submitted to the
Senate) and by Presidential proclamation of the same date.2 But,
as the Supreme Court pointed out: "A state of war did not in law
cease until the ratification in April, 1899, of the treaty of peace. 'A
truce or suspension of arms,' says Kent, 'does not terminate the
war, but it is one of the commercia belli which suspends its operations * * * At the expiration of the truce, hostilities may recommence without any fresh declaration of war'." 3 With reference to
this point, the attorney-general of the United States took the same
view, declaring that "notwithstanding the signing of the protocol
and the suspension of hostilities, a state of war between this country
and Spain still exists. Peace has not been declared and cannot be
declared except in pursuance of the negotiations between the peace
commissioners authorized by the protocol."4 Moreover, a recognition of the continuation of the war in spite of the suspension of hostilities and the signing of the protocol was expressed in the definitive
1

Mo0Rr:'s DIGSST oF INT. LAw, VII, 153•
• 30 STAT. AT L., 1780.
• Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, at p. 323.
• 22 OP. U. S. A'rTY.-GsN. 191.
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treaty of peace which, in the preamble, mentioned the desire of the
two parties "to end the war now e~isting between the two countries."5
The principle thus upheld by the Supreme Court, by the AttorneyGeneral and by the treaty-making authority would seem to be too
well established to be questioned. Nevertheless, in view of the
lengthy delay which has followed the signing of the armistices with
Germany and Austria-Hungary in November, 1918, due to the failure of the President and Senate to agree upon the terms of a definitive treaty, some question has been raised as to whether our status
since the suspension of hostilities is one of war or of peace. Diplomatic relations with 'the Central Powers remain severed, but commercial relations with Germany have been to some extent resumed.e
President Wilson, in transmitting to Congress on November II,
1918, the terms of the armistice, made the statement that "the war
thus comes to an end, for having accepted these terms of the armistice it will be impossible for the German command to renew it."
The President could scarcely have intended by this statement to indicate his belief that the war h~d been legally terminated, but
merely that for practical purposes actual warfare was at an end.
The above statement of the President, however, was construed by
a lower·Federal court as equivalent to an official proclamation by the
President of the end of the war. The question before the court
involved the construction of a provision of an act of Congress of
1917 which made criminal certain conduct if committed "during the
present war." The court declined to order the penalty inflicted, on
the ground that the war had in fact ended upon the announcement
of the President.7
This, however, does not seem to have been a well-considered case.
Even though the statement of the President had been intended as
an official proclamation of the legal end of the war, it is somewhat
doubtful whether the President could thus, by his sole act, upon the
mere signing of an armistice with a foreign belligerent, bring the
war to a legal termination. · It is true that the Supreme Court seems
•

I

MAI.LOY, TRtA~, II, l6go.

• Limited intercourse with the enemy may be permitted, even during
hostilities, by act of Congress prescribing th~ conditions under which it
may be carried on. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73.
• U. S. v. Hicks, 256 Fed. 707 (1919).
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to have held that the Civil War was ended in different states on different dates by Presidential proclamations.8 In case Congress had
by act or joint resolution adopted a different date as the end of the
Civil War from that mentioned in the President's proclamation, it
is not clear that the court would not have followed the determination
of Congress rather than of the President. Congress, however, in a
ptatute continuing a certain :i:ate of pay to soldiers in the army did
so "for three years after the close of the rebellion, as announced by
the President" in his proclamation.9 Congress thus adopted the date
set by the President, and the Supreme Court, in other cases, seems
to take the actions of both the President and Congress into consideration in determining the date of the conclusion of the Civil War.10
Even though it should be held that the proclamation oi the President alone was sufficient to terminate the Civil War, nevertheless
it is to be remembered that that war, though having in some of its
aspects the characteristics of a war between independent states, was
in other respects a mere domestic insurrection which was suppressed
by the overthrow ·of the insurrectionary government. Hence the
method to be pursued in determining the date of the conclusion of
the Civil War might well be different from that to be followed in
the case of a foreign war in which the foreign belligerent still has a
government in existence at the termination of hostilities. At any
rate, as indicated above, in the case of the armistices with the Central
Powers, the President's announcement to Congress is not to be considered as an official proclamation of the legal termination of the
war.
Congress has given evidence by its acts that it did not regard the
signing of the armistices of r9r8 and the announcement by the President as bringing the war to a legal termination. Thus, after the
armistice of November II, Congress passed and on November 2r,
1918, the President approved the War-time Prohibition Act, which
• The Protector, 12 '\Vall. 700; 14 STAT. AT L., 8u, 814
14 STAT. AT L., 422.
U. S. v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 70; McE1rath v. U. S., 102 U. S. 438;
Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 187. In the Anderson case, the court said:
D

20

"As Congress, in its legislation for the army has determined that the Rebellion closed on the 20th day of August, 1866, there is no reason why its
declaration on this subject should not be received as settling the question
wherever private rights are affected by it."
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made illegal the sale of distilled spirits for beverage purposes "after
June 30, 1919, until the conclusion of ¢.e present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall
be determined and proclaimed by the President"11 The validity of
this act was attacked in the Supreme Court of the United States on
the ground, among others, that demobilization had been effected,
that the war had been concluded, .and that thereby the war emergency upon which the operation of the act had been predicated was
removed. . The court, however, denied the contention and upheld
the validity and continued operation of the act of Congress in spite
of the cessation of hostilities. "In the absence," said the court, "of
specific provisions to the contrary the-period of war has been held
to extend·to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace or the proclamation of peace. * * * 'Conclusion of the war' dearly did not mean
cessation of hostilities; because the act was approved ten days after
hostilities had ceased upon the signing of the armistice. Nor may
we assume that Congress intended by that phrase to designate the
date when the Treaty of Peace should. be signed at Versailles or
elsewhere by German and American representatives, since by the
Constitution a treaty is only a proposal until approved by the Senate." The court also held that the President's statement that "the
war thus comes to an end" was meant in a popular sense and was
not an official proclamation of the termination of _the war.12
In addition to the War-time Prohibition Act, many other acts of
Congress passed during the World War provided that they should
remain in force until -the termination of the war or until a varying
length of time thereafter. Thus, in the Trading with the Enemy
Act of 1917, it is provided that "the words 'end of the war' as used
herein shall be deemed to mean the date of proclamation of exchange
of ratifications of the treaty of peace, unless the President shall, by
proclamation, declare a prior date, in which case the date so proclaimed shall be deemed to be the 'end of the war' within the meaning of this act." 13 This and corresponding provisions in other wartime acts of Congress indicate that it was the expectation of that
body that the war would end normally with a treaty of peace, but
the provision just quoted seems to indicate that Congress also
11

40 S'.l'A'l'. A'.!' L., 1045, 1046.
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Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146.

:IS
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THE TERMINATION OF WAR

thought that the war might terminate at a prior date by Presidential
proclamation. It is not to be supposed from this, however, that
Congress necessarily intended to intimate that a foreign war could
be terminated by mere presidential proclamation without a treaty
of peace, since this was the exercise by Congress of the power, not
to terminate war nor to determine the duration of the war in the
international sense, but merely to determine the period during which
one of its acts should remain in force.
The normal and usual method of terminating war between foreign nations is by a formal treaty of peace. The wars in which the
United States has been engaged have been almost invariably so terminated. In the case of the Spanish-American War as indicated above
the definitive treaty of peace was preceded by a preliminary agreement, which also included the armistice, providing for the suspension of hostilities. In the cases of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, there was no armistice nor preliminary agreement, but
the definitive treaty of peace was signed while hostilities were still
in progress. Even in the cases of the wars with the Barbary states,
in which, as we have seen, no formal declaratfons of war were issued by the United States, treaties of peace were negotiated. The
warlike operations conducted between the United States and F.rance
in 1798 did not, as we have seen, constitute a full-fledged war, and
the treaty of l8oo by which amicable relations between the two
countries were restored was not, strictly speaking, a treaty of peace.
Most of the treaties of peace to which the United States has been
a party mention .in the preamble the desfr:e ·of the parties to end the
war existing between them. The French treaty of 1800, however,
speaks of the desire of the parties merely "to terminate the differ-·
ences" which have arisen between them.14
While it is generally recognized that a treaty of peace is the
normal and usual method of terminating a war between foreign
nations, the question may be raised as to whether this is the sole
method which the United States can adopt in terminating a foreign
war. That it is the sole method has sometimes been asserted by
good authorities. Thus, in the course of his opinion in the case of
Ware v. Hylton in the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice
Chase said: "A war between two nations can only be concluded by
l•

MAI.LOY, fuATn:S,

I, 4g6.
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·treaty."15 Again, Senator Lodge, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said on the floor of Congress: "Peace can be made
only by the President and Senate."18 These statements, however,
were obiter and cannot be accepted as conclusive of the matter. It
does not follow that, pecause all the previous foreign wars in which
· the United States has been engaged have been ended by treaty, that
is the only way in which such a war of the United States may be
ended.
There are three ways generally recognized in international law
whereby war may be terminated. Coleman Phillipson, at the beginning of his work on the subject, states them as follows: "(1) by a
mere cessation of hostilities on both sides, without any definite understanding supervening; (2) by the conquest and subjugation of
one of the contending parties by the other, so that the former is
reduced to impotence and submission; (3) by a mutual arrangement embodied in a treaty of peace, whether the honors of war be
equal· or unequal."17
With reference to the power of the United States to terminate
war in these three ways, it ·has sometimes been questioned whether
the United States is empowered to terminate war by the conquest
and subjugation of the enemy. This doubt is based upon a statement by Chief Justice Taney in the case of Fleming v. Page in which
he said: "The genius and character of our institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress
for the purposes of aggression or aggrandizement * * * A war,
therefore, declared by Congress, can never be presumed to be waged
for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of territory; nor does
the law declaring the war imply an authority to the President to enlarge the limits of the United States by subjugating the enemy's
country."18 In the same opinion, however, the Chief Justice admits
that, by the laws and usages of nations, conquest is a valid title, and
it has been recognized.by the Supreme Court that the United States
has full powers in international relations that other sovereign and
independent nations have.19 Certainly, the courts would not inter.. 3 Dall. 236.
'"C0Ncro:ss10NAL

~coRD,

" Tr:RMIN ATION OF

W AB.

April 21, l9I4. Vol. 51, p. 6g6s.
TRSATitS OF hAcE, p. 3.

AND

•• 9 How. 6o3, 614
10

Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 6g8.
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fere if the United States prosecuted a duly declared foreign war
to the extent of subjugating the enemy and overthrowing his government. 20
The termination of war by the reciprocal intermission of hostilities has sometimes occurred. When, in r868, hostilities between
Spain and Peru having ceased for several years without a treaty
of peace, and the United States having offered to sell certain warships to Peru, Spain protested that this action would violate our
neutrality as the status of war still continued. Secretary of State
Seward denied the Spanish contention, however, on the ground that
the war had ended. "It is certain," he said, "that a condition of war
can be raised without an authoritative declaration of war, and, on
the other hand, the situation of peace may be restored by the long
suspension of hostilities without a treaty of peace being made." 21
In case the United States should be a party to a war which resulted in the complete subjugation CYf the enemy and the overthrow
of his government or in the cessation of hostilities for a sufficient
length of time to indicate that there is no intention of renewing
them, there either would or could be no formal treaty of peace and
the question would then arise as to where, in our government, the
power to declare peace resides. Where war is ended by treaty, the
treaty is primarily a contract or bargain between the powers concerned, which is recognized as binding by international law if no
duress has been exercised against the negotiators. Furthermore, in
the United States, a treaty is a part of the supreme law of the land,
and this is therefore a legal method of ending war. Subjugation of
the enemy and long cessation of hostilities, however, are facts and
not laws, though legal inferences and condusions may be built upon
them. The question is, in our government,. what branch or authority is competent to establish the legal inference that, as the result
of such facts, the war is ended and peace is restored?
The Constitution makes no specific grant of power to any branch
of the government to make peace. In the Constitutional Convention, ho\vever, the matter came up for discussion on August r7,
r787, in connection with the consideration of the power to make
war. Mr. Pinckney was in favor of vesting the power to make war
in the Senate, remarking that "it would be singular for one author00

Cf. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. I.
"'DIP. CoR. 1868, II, 32, quoted by MooM, DIG.

OF

INT. LAW, VII, 336.
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ity to make w~r and another peace," thus in4icating his belief that
the power to make treaties, which at that stage in the proceedings
was vested in the Senate alone, included the power to make peace.22
This view was also held by Mr. Ellsworth, who declared that "there
is a material difference between the cases of making war and making peace. It should be more easy to get out of war than into it.
War also is. a simple and overt declaration; peace attended with intricate and ~ecret negotiations." Mr. Mason also was for "clogging
rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace." When,
therefore, it was moved to add "and peace" after "war" so as to
give Congress the power· to declare war and peace, it was unanimously voted down. 28
The above proceedings of the Convention, together with those
which took place in connection with the consideration of the treatymaking power, indicate that the convention assumed that there was
no such similarity in the methods to be pursued in declaring war
and in making peace as that they should necessarily be vested in the
same branch of government. W.hile the Convention assumed that
the power to make treaties included the power to make peace, it
did not exclusively vest the latter power by an express grant in any
branch of the government, nor did it expressly deny to Congress
such power. It may be that the Convention felt that if Congress
were given the power to make peace, then such grant might be construed as exclusive, and thus peace could not be made by the treatymaking power and ·vice versa. There is nothing, however, to indicate that the Convention considered at all the case where a war results in the subjugation of the enemy and the overthrow of his government so that no functionaries exist with which a treaty can be
made C?r the case where hostilities have long since ceased and the
treaty-making power is impotent to conclude peace on account of
an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the President and the
Senate over the terms of the treaty. Had these cases been <:onsidered, it is not clear that the Convention would not have vested the
power to declare peace under such circumstances in some body other
than the treaty-making authority.
The consideration of the second of the two cases mentioned above
has recently become of prnctical importance on account of the fail"'JoURNAI. oF TH~ CoNSTITUTIONAI. CoNVr:NTION,
23

Ibid., p. 189.

[Hunt. Ed..] II,

188.
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ure of the President and the Senate for a long time to agree upon
the terms of the treaty of p"eace with Germany. In view of the
deadlock between the -component parts of the treaty-making authority, Congress essayed to take the initiative in restoring peace by
passing a joint resolution for that purpose. The joint resolution,
which was passed by Congress and vetoed by the President in May,
1920, reads in part as follows: "That the joint resolution of Congress passed April 6, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between
the Imperial German Government and the Government and people
of the United States, and making provisions to prosecute the same,
be, and the same is hereby, repealed, and said state of war is hereby
declared at an end."24
The question of the power of Congress to declare peace after a
foreign war, not having ·before arisen in a practical form, has been
comparatively little considered. Some expressions of opinion, however, have been made on the point and apparently contradictory
statements can be found. Hare, in his work on the Constitution,
says: "It is the right of the President, and not of Congress, to
determine whether the terms (of peace) are advantageous, and if
he refuses to make peace, the war must go on." 25 Similarly, in the
report of the Judiciary Committee of the forty-ninth Congress on
the treaty power, made by John Randolph Tucker, it is stated that
"Congress cannot create the status of peace by repealing its declaration of war, because the former requires the concurrence of two
wills, the latter but the action of one."28 In his work on the Constitution, however, Tucker says: "Is there no end to the war except at the will of the President and Senate? No authority can be
cited on the question, but the writer thinks a repeal of a law requiring war would be effectual to bring about the status of peace in
place of war." 27 Judge Baldwin appears to be of the same opinion.
"Peace," he says, "could no doubt also be restored by an act of
Congress. As a declaration of war takes ·the shape with us of a
statute, it would seem that it can be repealed by a statute."28 A sim"'Co=-iGRESSIONAL Ri;coRD, May IS, 1920, Vol. 59, p. 768o.
25
J. I. C. HAR£, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. I, p. 171-2.
'"Quoted by H. ST. G. TucK£R, "LIMITATIONS ON TH£ TR£A'J.'Y-MAKING
Pow£R," p. 357.
"']. R. TucKI;R, "TH£ CONSTITUTION oF THS UNITED STAT~," Vol. II,
p. 7I8.
""S. E. Baldwin in AM. Joun. OF INT. LAW, Vol. 12, pp. 13-14.

MICHIGAN LAW REViEW

ilar conclusion is reached by Whiting, who says: "As it is in the
power of the Legislative Department tb declare war, and to provide
or withhold the means of carrying it on, Congress also may, after
hostilities shall have ceased, declare or recognize peace."29
The different statements quoted above appear to be somewhat
contradictory, but they are capable of being, at least to some extent, reconciled. Hare and Tucker in the report cited are evidently
speaking of a n~gotiated peace, which Congress confessedly cannot
make since it has no means of carrying on pourparlers directly with a
foreign government. In the exercise of its power to regulate foreign
commerce, however, or in the exercise of some other granted power,
Congress can pass a law embodying proposed terms of peace and can
make the operation of such law contingent upon the consent of the
enemy government being secured to such terms, but the communication of such terms to the enemy and the notification by the enemy
of their acceptance must be transmitted through the President and
such offer and acceptance would constitute an international agreement if not a treaty. 'Baldwin a!ld Tucker in their treatise on the
Constitution do not specify the sort of peace to which they are referring, and their statements, in the unqualified form in which they
appear, cannot be fully accepted as invariably true. The determination of the question is dependent on collateral facts and circumstances, which differ in different cases. Whiting's statement, though
general in form, doubtless refers primarily to the case of a civil
war. Moreover, he does not assert the power of Congress to create
a status of peace, but merely to declare or recognize its existence
after hostilities shall ·have ceased.
By the reciprocal intermission of hostilities if long continued, the
concurring will to peace of the erstwhile enemy may be indicated
without formal notification, especially if evidenced by some positive
action that there is no intention of renewing them. It would hardly
be maintained that Congress could end a foreign war by declaring
peace in the midst of a campaign while the war is being actively
waged on both sides. Of course, under the Constitution, Congress
cannot appropriate funds for the support of the army for a longer
period than two years, and Congress might withhold or limit appropriations for this purpose whether hostilities are in progress or not,
and thus tie the hands of the President in prosecuting the war and
20

W. Whiting, "War Powers Under the Constitution," [43rd Ed.], p. 312.
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compel him to sue for peace, but such action on the part of Congress would not end the war as a legal status.
The passage of a peace resolution by Congress, based on the assumption that the former enemy has no intention of further prosecuting hostilities, would indicate that such is also no longer the
intention of our Government so far as Congress can determine the
policy of our Government in such a matter, and would have weight
as coming from that branch of the Government whose action and
cooperation are necesasry not only for the declaration of war but
also for its vigorous prosecution. The passage of such a resolution
would indicate that, so long at least as Congress remained of the
same mind, funds for the further prosecution of the war would not
be forthcoming. It would, if coupled with the continued cessation
of hostilities by the former enemy, constitute a concurrent undertaking to terminate the war without terms, but such action by Congress would not preclude the subsequent making and ratification of
a treaty defining the terms of peace. The concurrent undertaking
to terminate the war might possibly be tacit if cessation of hostilities
be sufficiently long continued, or the intention not to renew them
might be indicated by positive action. In the case of the attempt
to terminate war with Germany, the undertaking of that power not
to renew hostilities was evidenced by her ratification of the Treaty
of Versailles, which itself provided that, upon its coming into force,
(which should happen upon its ratification by Germany and three
of the allied and associated powers), the state of war should terminate. In spite of this provision, however, the state of war between
the United States and Germany continued in the absence of ratification of the treaty by the United States, but, even so, the war could
doubtless be terminated by a similar concurrent undertaking on the
part of the United States not to renew hostilities, as evidenced by
a joint resolution of Congress.
A state of war may exist before it is formally declared by Con~
gress. It has been customary for Congress not to declare war, but
to recognize by declaration the existence of a state of war through
the acts of the foreign government against which the declaration is
directed. The Constitution does not specifically vest Congress with
the power to recognize the existence of a state of war, but it will not
be denied th~t this power is implied and included in the power to
declare war. Hence, it may be argued that Congress has the implied
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power to recognize by declaration a state or condition in which war
has in fact ceased, due to the long cessation of hostilities or to the
complete subjugation of the enemy. Even though the international
force of such a Congressional ~eclaration might be denied, it would
still have domestic force with reference to the rights and duties of
our citizens. Such a Congressional determination, as we have seen,
has been recognized by the Supreme Court as having weight in a
domestic sense in the case of our Civil War.'ZO If the Confederacy
had been successful, the Civil War would doubtless have been terminated by a treaty of peace. As it was, the method of its termina·
tlon differed but little from that which would be followed in the
case of a foreign war in which the United Stat,es should completely
subjugate the enemy and overthrow his government.
The ground upon which the power of Congress to declare peace
is usually based is its power to repeal any act or resolution which
it had the power to pass. Thus, it has been said that "Congress has
the right, simply by virtue of its power to repeal its previous enactments, to declare hostilities with Germany to be at an end, and its
declaration to this effect, once duly enacted, will be binding upon
the Courts and the Executive alike." 31 It does not necessarily follow, however, that from the mere fact that Congress by act or joint
resolution can create a status of war, it can restore peace by a simple
repeal of its former act. This seems to have been tacitly admitted
by the framers of the Congressional peace resolution of 1920, which
provided not only for the repeal of the previous declaration of war
but also expressly declared the state of war thereby created to be
at an end. They thus assumed to exercise the power, not only to
recognize the existence of peace by repealing the declaration of
war, -but also to create a status of peace by Congressional resolution.
Congress can doubtless repeal its declaration of war, but the question is whether such repeal operates to restore peace. In the Hicks
case, cited above, with reference to the contention that since Congress alone can begin war, consequently it alone can terminate it,
the court said: "But that does not follow because the Constitution,
while in express terms giving Congress the sole power of declaring
war, in no way so expresses itself as to give that body any authority
30

U. S. v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 71.
E. S. Corwin, "The Power of Congress to Declare Peace,"
LAW ~VIt.W, XVIII, 674
31
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itself to terminate it."32 Congress can pass an act or joint resolution admitting a state into the Union, but it would hardly be maintained that, after a state has once been admitted, Congress could
expel it by a simple repeal of the act admitting it. Similarly, Congress can by resolution propose a constitutional amendment to the
state legislatures for ratification, but after the proposed amendment
has been transmitted to the legislatures the function of Congress is
at an end.33 ·These instances, however, merely indicate that Congress cannot always undo what it has the power to do, but do not
necessarily prove that it cannot restore peace by the repeal of the
declaration of war.
Light on "the question as to the power of Congress to restore peace
may perhaps be drawn by analogy from the power of Congress to
acquire new territory. This power also is not expressly granted in
the Constitution to any branch of the government, but it has been
implied from the powers to make war and to make treaties,114 but
may also be derived from the principle that, in its international relations, the United States has such powers as international law recognizes in states generally. The usual method of acquiring territory
has been by treaty, but that method has been followed only when
there was a ceding power with which a treaty could be made and
which continued to exist as an independent government after the
annexation of such territory to the United States. Texas and Hawaii were acquired by joint resolution of Congress. In both those
cases, there were no governments with which to make treaties except the governments of the territories annexed, which ceased to
have an independent existence at the moment of annexation. Texas
was annexed in pursuance of the express grant to Congress of the
power to admit new states into the Union, but since Hawa~i was not
admitted as a state, its annexation by Congress represents a greater
extension of power.
Another example of the acquisition of territory by Congress is
found in the operation of the guano island act of 1856, which provides that when any citizen of the United States discovers a guano
island not occupied by the citizens of any other government and not
within the lawful jurisdiction of any foreign country and shall take
.. U. S. v. Hicks, 256 Fed. 707.
"']AM~N, THI~ CONSTITUTIONAi, CoNW:NTION,

"'American Insurance Co. v. Canter,

I

Pet. 5u.

[Ist ed.], p. 505, sec. 549.
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peaceable possession 0£ the same, such island may, at the discretion
of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United
States.35 The question of the validity of this act arising in the Supreme Court, that tribunal found ample warrant for it in the principle that, by international law, territory may be acquired by discovery or occupation, as well as by cession or conquest, and when
citizens of a nation take possession of unoccupied teqitory, the nation to. which such ~itizens belong may exercise such jurisdiction as
it sees fit over the territory so acquired.86
In the case of acquisition of territory, the power of Congress
to do so by statute or joint resolution is recognized as proper where
there is no foreign government with which a treaty can appropriately be made. The same distinction would be followed in the
case of the alienation of territory. If alienated to a foreign power,
it would seem that the treaty method would have to be adopted, but
if the alienation take place in the form of a grant of independence
to a particular portion· of our territory, the appropriate method
would be by statute or joint resolution.87 Similarly, in the case of
making peace, it would seem that where the subjugation of the enemy by the United States and the overthrow of his government occurs, since there is then no government with which to make a treaty,
it becomes by analogy the function of Congress by act or joint resolution to declare peace. Also, in the case of the long cessation of
hostilities, since this is recognized by international law as a method
of ending war, if there is no intention of renewing such hostilities,
the evidence of such lack of intention might, if predicated on sufficient evidence of a similar lack of intention on the part of the former enemy, be given by Congressional act or joint resolution.88 It
has been objected that, if Congress can declare peace, it can also
pass a law to bring the army home and thus interfere in the direc.. II STAT. AT
00

L.,

II9.

Jones v. United States, 137 U. S.
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Congress could obviously not take such action by concurrent resolution, since this would be an attempt to exclude the President from an act
of a legislative character. The joint resolution, however, could be passed
over the President's veto, but the President could still prevent the full return of normal peace conditions by refusing to resume diplomatic relations.
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tion of the army in the midst of a campaign.30 This would not necessarily follow, but even if it did, the difficulty would be largely
avoided by confining the power of Congress to declare peace to the
two cases mentioned. Where, however, the government of the enemy has not been overthrown nor have hostilities ceased for so
long a time as to indicate that there is no intention of renewing
them, the only appropriate method of ending war is by the exercise
of the treaty power. If the treaty method is followed in terminating the war, the exact date of its termination, in so far as its domestic effect is concerned, may still be determined by the President,
since the treaty of peace is put into effect in a domestic sense by
proclamation of the President, and the date of the termination of
the war as fixed in such proclamation need not necessarily correspond with the actual date of the exchange of ratifications of the
definitive treaty of peace.
In the two cases mentioned,--overthrow of the enemy's government, and long cessation of hostilities-if Congress fails to act, can
the President bring the war to an end by proclamation? In August,
1919, Senator Fall of New Mexico propounded the following question to President Wilson: "In your judgment, have you not the
power and authority, by a proclamation, to declare in appropriate
words that peace exists and thus restore the status of peace between
the government and people of this country and those with whom we
declared war?" The President's reply was: "I feel constrained
to say * * * not only that in my judgment I have not the power by
proclamation to declare that peace exists, but that I could in no circumstances consent to take such a course prior to the ratification of
a formal treaty of peace."40 In view of the fact that neither of the
two conditions mentioned in which Congress can declare peace then
e:idsted, as well as of the fact that the treaty of peace then pending
before the Senate had been neither ratified nor rejected by that body,
there seems to be no reason to question the correctness of the President's answer. But if either of these two conditions existed, it
would seem that, by analogy with the method of ending the Civil
War, there is some ground to suppose that the President would
have the power in question although the question is involved in
.. Speech of Mr. Connally in House of Representatives, CoNG~SSlONAI.
Rf:coRD, April 8, 1920, vol. 59, p. 5773.
•• CoNG~sioNAL R£coRD, Aug. 22, 1919, pp. 4434 4435.
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some doubt. In one case, as we have seen, the Supreme Court
seemed· to recognize the dates of the termination of the Civil War
as depending on the proclamations of the President, without considering the concurrent action of Congress.u The dates chosen by the
President in .his proclamation, however, were sanctioned by a subsequent act of Congress, and the Supreme Court in other cases seems
to consider the action of Congress as of substantial if not controlling
weight in determining the end of the Civil War. 42 The situation
with reference to $e power in question seems analogous to that
witli reference to the power to permit limited intercourse with the
enemy in time of war. In each case, it would seem that the President alone may exercise the power, though probably not if against
the expressed will of Congress; but, whether so or not, he may exercise it with the concurrent authority of Congress. 43 In the absence
of any conflicting action on the part of Congress, the courts would
doubtless consider themselves bound by the President's proclamation in determining private rights, as, in the case of the Protector,
the Supreme Court considered it.self so bound, "in the absence of
more certain criteria, of equally general application." 44
JOHN M. MATHEWS.

University of Illinois.
1

The Protector, 12 Wall. 700.
.. U. S. v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 71.
/.. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73. In this connection it may be pointed
out that certain war-time acts of Congress indicate that, in the opinion of
that body, the President alone by proclamation could at least recognize the
termination of war for the purpose of indicating the period during which
such legislation should operate. See, e. g., 40 STAT. AT L., 4I2.
" 12 Wall. 700.
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